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CASESNONNISSE 773 
SUCCESSIVE SALES: CORDIALITY DOES NOT 
GIVE YOU LOCUS" STANDI 
Cordiant Trading CC v Daimler Chrysler Financial 
Services (Pty) Ltd 2005 4 SA 389 (D&ClD) 
1 Introduction 
Under normal circumstances, the seller is the owner of the merx and 
ownership is transferred to the purchaser on transfer of possession. 
However, the seller does not undertake to make the purchaser the owner. 
His obligation is to deliver the merx, and guarantee the purchaser free and 
undisturbed possession, that is, to protect the buyer in his possession from 
eviction (see Zulman and Kairinos Norman's Law of Purchase and Sale in 
South Africa (2005) 145). Eviction means any lawful interference with this 
free and undisturbed possession (vacua possessio), whether by the seller 
himself or by a third party. The warranty against eviction is in" effect a 
promise by the seller that he will compensate the purchaser if the purchaser 
is evicted (Kerr The Law of Sale and Lease (2004) 188). 
Constitutum possessorium, as a mode of delivery of ownership of 
movables, plays an important role in financial arrangements in the motor 
trade industry. "A motor dealer may, for example; arrange with a credit 
institution that the motor vehicles on its floor, purchased from a 
manufacturer, be sold to the credit institution and then be resold to the motor 
dealer. Ownership is transferred to the credit institution by constitutum 
possessorium (see Van der MeMie "Things" Lawsa vol 27 (first reissue) 
308). The arrangement between the motor dealer and the credit institution is 
referred to in the trade as a floor plan agreement. 
2 Facts 
The facts of this case may be briefly summarised as follows: In terms of a 
floor plan finance agreement, the respondent, Daimler Chrysler Financial 
Services (Pty) Ltd (DCFS) sold motor vehicles to a dealer, Fourways Motors. 
In terms of the agreement, ownership of the vehicles remained vested in 
DCFS until any dealer buying the said vehicles had paid the purchase price 
in full (392G). A separate agreement with Mercedes-Benz of SA (pty) Ltd 
provided for DCFS to pay the manufacturer within 30 days of invoice or 24 
hours of payment of the full purchase price (392G-H). 
The applicant, Cordiant Trading CC (Cordiant), purchased 16 vehicles at 
a cost exceeding R3-million from Fourways Motors (~92A-B). Cordiant paid 
for the vehicles with cheques and cash and took "delivery" thereof. At the 
time of the sales, Cordiant received invoices and vehicle registration papers 
(392C-D). DCFS, the credit institution, had not been paid for the vehicles by 
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the dealer, Fourways Motors (392D-E). Cordiant, thinking it was the owner of 
the vehicles, sold the vehicles to different car dealers who in turn sold them 
to ·'final customers" (398G-H; and 398B-C). DCFS submitted that ownership 
of the vehicles vested in it in terms of the floor plan agreement (392E). 
DCFS dispatched letters to' the possessors of the vehicles that had 
emanated from Fourways Motors, calling upon the possessors to pay for the 
vehicles or return them, and threatened them with legal proceedings for the 
recovery of the vehicles (392E-F). 
Cordiant applied for an interdict restraining DCFS from attaching and 
removing some of the vehicles and for an order directing it to return certain 
others, pending finalisation of an action for the declaration that the 
respondent had no right to seek recovery of the vehicles (391 G-H). Cordiant 
argued that it brought the application on behalf of the dealers who had on-
sold to other customers because the customers would have recourse to the 
dealers who had bought the vehicles from Cordiant (398B-C). 
3 Legal issue 
At issue was, amongst othe~. whether under the circumstances Gordiant 
had locus standi to interdict DCFS from attaching the vehicles (398D-E). 
4 Decision 
At the outset, it must be remembered that none of the vehicles were still in 
the possession of the purchasers (motor dealers) who had bought the 
vehicfes from Cordia'nt but had been on-sold to customers (398E). Normally 
the' seller is the owner of the merx and ownership is transferred to the 
purchaser on transfer of possession. The purchaser will have an a'ction 
against the seller who sells a merx he knows that he does not own (Kerr 
187; and Kahn, Havenga, Havenga and Lotz Principles of the Law of Sale 
and Lease (1998) 21). But what is the position if the seller bona fide believes 
himself to be the owner? The purchaser will then have an action against the 
seller when he is evicted, or threatened with eviction, by a third party with a 
better legal title than the seller (Kahn et al 21; and Kerr 188 and further). 
Eviction usually involves the purchaser being deprived of possession of the 
merx by the true owner (Par Excellence Colour Printing (Pty) Ltd v Ronnie 
Cox Graphic Supplies (pty) Ltd 1983 1 SA 295 (A) 307 A). 
The warranty only applies to eviction by a third party with a better legal 
title, which means that all the seller warrants is that the purchaser will not be 
lawfully evicted because of. defective title (Lammers and Lammers v 
Giovannoni 1955 3 SA 385 (A) 397S .. C). The warranty therefore does not 
protect the purchaser against the unlawful acts of others. 
If a third party, in this instance DCFS, claims ownership of the merx anq 
demands possession, the purchaser, in this instance the persons that 
purchased from the dealers, who bought from Cordiant, should inform the 
seller and call on him to assist in his defence. If the purchaser is not able to 
find the seller to notify him, the purchaser should conduct a proper and 
competent defence (York & Co (Pvt) Ltd v Jones NO (1) 1962 1 SA 65 (SR) 
SSC-F). These steps are, however, no longer absolute requirements. If the 
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purchaser is able to show that the third party's claim is unassailable in law, 
he may simply give up possession of the merx on demand and then claim for 
performance of the warranty (Garden City Motors (Pty) Ltd .v Bank of the 
OFS Ltd 1983 2 SA 104 (N) 107G-108G; and see also Zulman and Kairinos 
150-151).. tn this instance, the legally unassailable claim was constituted by 
the reservation of ownership in the floor plan agreement between Fourways 
Motors and DCFS (399C-D). The court, by implication, accepted that DCFS 
was the reat owner (398G-H). 
If the purchaser does conduct a proper and competent defence but is 
unsuccessful, this is sufficient to show the sener that the third party's claim 
was unassailable in law. If the purchaser defends and is successful, he 
cannot claim reimbursement from the seller because the warranty does not 
cover eviction by claimants with inferior title (Lammers and Lammers v 
Giovannoni supra 397B-C). 
The question then arises as to who can sue on account of eviction. It often 
happens that A sells to Band B sells to C and C to D (possession· being 
transferred in each case) before the true owner makes his claim. In this 
instance, Fourways Motors sold to Cordiant who. sold to the various dealers 
who later sold to the "final customers" (399E). There is a decided body of 
case law which shows that once a claim has been made against D (in this 
case the final customer), and he has surrendered the thing sold, whether 
after judgment or because he can show that the~claimant (DCFS) has a 
legally unassailable right, he may claim yompensation from C (the dealers 
who purchased from Cordiant), and C may claim fr~m B (Cordiant) who can 
then claim from A (Fourways Motors). (See Westeel Engineering (Pty). Ltd v 
Sydney Glow & Co Ltd 1968 3 SA 458 (T) 462C; Olivier v Van der Bergh 
1956 1 SA 802 (C) 803D-H, 804C-O, 806E-F; Garden City Motors (Pty) Ltd v 
Bank of the Orange Free State Ltd supra; Louis Botha Motors v James & 
S/abbert Motors 1983 3 SA 793 (A) 798H; and Kerr 194-195.) If D (the final 
customer) wishes to sue the original seller (Fourways Motors) direct, it may 
only do so on obtaining cession of action (Louis Botha Motors supra 801A; 
and Zulman and Kairinos 146). Unfortunately, in this instance, Fourways 
Motors had been placed under provisional liquidation, leaving Cordiant .in an 
unfavourable position with regard to its claim in terms of the warranty 
(393A). Cordiant therefore saw fit to bring an interdict on behalf of the 
dealers who had on-sold the vehicles, in order to prevent DCFS from 
claiming the vehicles from the end customers. 
Applying these principles of successive sales, the court concluded that 
Cordiant could not protect purchasers of vehicles from the dealers to whom 
it sold (400D-E). The court therefore held that the applicant had no locus 
standi to interdict DCFS from reclaiming the vehicles (400E-F). The court 
held that, at best, Cordiant could have protected it~ own purchasers but not 
those who purchased from them (4008). 
It is also interesting to note that counsel for Cordiant argued that the . 
action of eviction by DCFS on the customers who bought from Cordiant's 
purchasers was a delict or tort and that Cordiant was entitled to protect them 
against DCFS (400B). The courtt citing Trimble v Plunkett (1910 WLD 220 
224), rejected this argument (400C-D). The notion of "torts" does not ,form 
part of the South African law of delict. . , 
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As mentioned above, the court, by implication, accepted that DCFS was 
th!3 "real owner" (398G-H). Whet~er acquisition of ownership by DCFS took 
pl~ce by constitutum possessorium and whether the requirements for this 
form of delivery were met were not raised in this decision. Let us assume, 
w~ich is not clear from. the .~ecision, that initially the manufacturer, 
Mercedes-Benz of SA (pty) Ltd sold the vehicles to Fourways Motors. Let us 
further assume that Fourways Motors sold the vehicles to DCFS in order to 
pay the manufacturer. DCFS in turn sold the vehicles in terms of the floor 
plan agreement to Fourways Motors. At issue would then be whether DCFS 
acquired ownership by means of delivery by constitutum possessorium. The 
applicant (or llfinal customers" in respective proceedings for the recovery of 
the vehicles) should then rather have attempted to show that DCFS did not 
acquire ownership from Fourways Motors by constitutum possessoriumby 
showing that the requirements had not been complied with (see Van der 
Merwe 308 as to the requirements of constitutum possessorium). Floor plan 
agreements have been used in. the motor industry since the 1960s by 
providing for security in stock by means of the retention of ownership 
(Nedcor Bank Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd 1998 2 SA 830 (W) 838G; and Van der 
Merwe and Smith "Financing the Purchase of Stock by the Transfer of 
Ownership as Security: A Simulated Transaction" 1999 Stell LR 304 305). 
Upon non-compliance with the requirements of constitutum possessorium or 
a court finding that a particular floor plan agreement between a motor 
vehicle dealer and a financial institution was nothing more than a simulated 
transaction to constitute a· form of pledge without possession, ownership is 
not acquired by the financial institution (see Bank Windhoek Bpk v Rajie 
1 ~94 1 SA 115 (A) 142A-G; and Nedcor Bank Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd supra 
8341-838G). Perhaps a totally different outcome could have been achieved 
had the modes of transfer of ownership been more closely scrutinised. For 
purposes of our further discussion we, however, accept that DCFS was the 
true owner of the ·vehicles. 
On the facts of thts case Cordiant was entrusted with the possession of 
the motor vehicles, the registration papers thereof, and invoices, and was 
"~Ilowed" to deal with the vehicles. For purposes of the defence of estoppel, 
t~ese actions may be construect.as entrusting Cordiant with the. indicia qf 
ownership or ius disponendi (see·E/ectiolux (pty) Ltd v Khota 1961 4 SA 244 
(V:J) 2478; Oakland Nominees (~y) Ltd v Gelria Mining and Investmen~ Co 
(Pty) Ltd 1976 1 SA 441 (A) 454E-F; Konstanz Properties (pty) Ltd v Wtri 
Spilhaus en Kie (WP) 8pk·1996 j SA 273 (A) 287A-288D; Quenty's Motors 
(F'tY) Ltd v·Standard Credit Corporation Ltd 1994 3 SA 188 (A) 199A-200B; 
Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman's Law of 
Property (2003)·247; and Van der Merwe 340). If the other requirements of 
estoppel (see Van der Merwe 339-340; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Masted 
236-237) had been met, the defence of estoppel could probably have been 
raised by the "final customers" against the rei vindicatio of DCFS in th~ 
respective proceedings. for recovery of the vehicles. 
On the evidence the court acc~pted that Cordiant (a) was unaware of the 
floor plan agreement between Fourways Motors and DCFS (39aG): (b) 
t~ought it was becoming the owner because Fourways Motors was the "re~! 
owner'; and (c) thought it was the owner of the vehicles when it sold them to 
the dealers (398G-H). For purpbses of the transfer .of qwnership and thEi 
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application of the rei vindicatio, which is a real action by an owner, these 
factors are, of course, of no avail to a possessor in terms of a contract of 
sale. An owner deprived of his property, . whether against his will or on Dis 
own accord, is entitled to vindicate it from any possessor, whether such 
possessor is bona fide or mala fide (Sonnekus (with Neels) Sakereg 
Vonnisbundel 467 and further; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert 227). 
Centlivres CJ decided as follows in Grosvenor Motors . (Potchefstroom) Ltd v 
Doug/as (1956 3 SA 420 (A) 425E): 
"If I seek to recover my property from a man in the street; he cannot be heard 
to say that he is under no obligation to restore it to me because he bought it 
from a third person and paid for it under the belief that .that person was the 
owner of it because I allowed him to be in possession of it." 
5 Conclusion 
The correctness· of the decision. is not questioned. Applying the principles 
relating to successive sales found in the warranty of eviction, it is clear that 
the court could not have come to a different conclusion. Cordiant WOUld, at 
best, only have been able to protect its immediate purchasers, and not the 
"final customers". 
It is submitted, however, that the court could perhaps have placed more 
emphasis on the dichotomy between contract and delivery of ownership and 
the operation of an owner's rei vindicatio. This decision therefore illustrates 
the importance of the distinction between personal rights arising from 
contracts between parties and the transfer of real rights in terms· of real 
agreements· and delivery. Different remedies and defences are available 
depending on whether 1he right is a real right or a personal right. 
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